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A. No. 24263. In Bank. Dec. 7, 
rrHURMAN TUCKER, JR., a Minor, etc., et 
v. PHILIP LOMBARDO, 
Appellants, 
Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for in-
sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged 
a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, an in-
struction that the amount of care exercised by defendant 
be than would be necessary if he was not <uuHu<u,; 
and that where the danger of 
care to be used be 
jury that the standard of care required of de-
fendant was that of ordinary care under the circumstances. 
Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for 
sustained a boy who was struck by shot from a 
gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was proper 
to refuse instructions which attempted to place the burden 
of proof on defendant to show that he was not negligent. 
Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries 
sustained a boy who was struck by shot discharged from 
working at a skeet-shooting range, where the 
court in its instructions to the jury first defined 
and "ordinary care," stating that the amount of caution 
in accordance with the nature of the act and the 
circumstances, followed by an instruction wherein 
See Cal.Jur., § 8; Am.Jur., and Fire-
arms, § 22 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: (1-4, 6, 8, 9, 11] Weapons,§ 3; [5] 
§ 6; [7] Negligence, § 133; [10] Negligence, § 32; 
§ 27. 
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it was stated as a matter of law that "a firearm is capable of 
causing severe injury" and for that reason "defendant was re-
quired to foresee the possibility of injury and, to avoid it, to 
exercise a degree of care commensurate with and in proportion 
to the danger involved," the jury was clearly informed that 
defendant was required to exercise a degree of care com-
mensurate with and in proportion to the danger involved, and 
use of the word "may" in another part of such instruction 
could not have misled the jury in determining the quantum 
of care required. 
[4] !d.-Civil Liability-Evidence.-In an action for injuries sus-
tained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged from a gun 
while working at a skeet-shooting range, it is not error to 
receive evidence of the rules, practices and customs of skeet 
shooting, since they have a direct bearing on the question of 
defendant's negligence though they do not of themselves 
establish the standard of prudent conduct. 
[5] Negligence-Knowledge of Danger-Foreseen Consequences.-
Negligence is gauged by the ability to anticipate danger; 
reasonable foresight of harm is essential and supplies the 
criterion for determining whether negligence exists in a par-
ticular case, but one is not required to foresee every possible 
injury or anticipate against dangers it is not his duty to avoid. 
[6] Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for in-
juries sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged 
from a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, the trial 
court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa 
loquitur where it was at least arguable that the injury resulted 
from the boy's own negligent action or from failure of the 
skeet-range owners to provide a reasonably safe working area 
for him. 
[7] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Applicability of Doctrine.-
Applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine depends on 
whether it can be said, in the light of common experience, that 
the accident was more likely than not the result of defendant's 
negligence; where no balance of probabilities in favor of negli-
gence can be found, the doctrine does not apply. 
[8] Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for in-
juries sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged 
from a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was 
not error to refuse to give plaintiffs' requested instruction 
that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent where the sub-
ject of contributory negligence was properly covered in instruc-
tions defining the term, and where there was evidence from 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 23 et seq. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 295. 
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which the jury could have found that the boy was guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
[9] !d.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action for injuries 
sustained by a boy who was struck by shot discharged from 
a gun while working at a skeet-shooting range, it was not error 
to give, at defendant's request, instructions on the question of 
assumption of risk where there was evidence from the cir-
cumstances of the boy's work and his knowledge of skeet-
range practice that would support a finding that he had 
voluntarily assumed the risk of his employment. 
[10] Negligence-Assumption of Risk.-The doctrine of assump-
tion of risk is not limited to an action by an employee against 
his employer because of injuries suffered in the course of 
employment. 
[lla, llb] Weapons-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In an action 
for injuries sustained by a boy who was struck at a skeet-
shooting range by shot discharged from a gun while operating 
shielded apparatus for the ejection of "clay birds" or targets, it 
was not error to give, at defendant's request, an instruction 
that it is the duty of an employer to furnish his employee a 
safe place to work and that defendant, if exercising ordinary 
care himself, was entitled to assume that the boy's employer 
had furnished the boy a safe place within which to work and 
that defendant could further assume that the boy would rea-
sonably use the protection afforded him by the employer, where 
defendant was entitled to rely on the assumption that the 
owners of the skeet range had obeyed the law and had exercised 
reasonable care toward him and toward persons working on 
the range through having the range in reasonably safe con-
dition, he having testified that he did not know and had no 
reason to assume that any shot fired from designated stations 
would enter the place where the boy was working. 
[12] Negligence-Anticipating Negligence of Others.-Every per-
son who is exercising ordinary care has a right to presume 
that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William P. Haughton, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
Madden & McCarry for Appellants. 
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Gerold C. Dunn and Henry F. Walker 
for Respondent. 
in the (~ontrol 
binl 's release. In skeet shooting, the gunner 
' at the line and calls " 
command the operator in the control house presses the button 
which releases the bird in the machine. while 
in the high was struck shot 
from a gun held 
number 8 the skeet range. 
eye. 
The range where the accident occurred 
in a half circle. Station number 1 was at the 
nnmber 7 was at the low house, and the 
stations formed a semi-circle arching to the south. 
number 8 located at the of 
from station Jmmber 1 to station number 7, 
vvas about feet to the east of the house. \Vhen 
the bird was released from the house for a gunner at 
of would be the 
TUCKER 'V. LOJ>IBARDO 
was 
east wall and was 7 inches and 
was shielded metal 
outer wall. The machine -vvas mounted 
shelf which extended inches back from the 
of the house. From the of this shelf 
rear or west wall of the house was 
that in operating the trap 
bird in the machine and cock it pulling down a 
then he would back to the wall behind him so as 
to be clear of the upward of the lever. After 
the in the control house released the 
forward toward the machine and reload it. There 
was no communication between the house and the con-
and would step forward to reload without 
whether a gun was fired at the released bird. While 
he could hear the of a gun if there was not too much 
from the lever he could not tell from which 
or at what bird it was fired. 
Defendant Lombardo was a over-and-under 
with which he was familiar. He had shot skeet 
once or twice previously. Standing in 
at station number 8, he looked toward the 
" 
" as the for the operator, and waited the 
bird emerge. He testified that he raised his gun and fired 
as the bird was approximately 2 feet from the house. A 
second or two later defendant heard "holler" and saw 
him come out of the high house. 
testified that after the bird had been 
forward to load the machine; that he was 
for one of the birds stacked on the shelf the machine 
when he was struck by some pellets from the ; that he 
was thrown against the wall and his face was One 
of the pellets caused a double perforation of his right eye, 
which was subsequently removed. 
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Defendant introduced photographs of the high house show-
ing perforations resembling shot punctures in the corrugated 
metal around the opening. The operator of the control 
house testified that when the boys first started to work in 
the high house, they were told to stand back after putting 
the target in the trap machine; that he knew that shot had 
come before into the high house through the opening and that 
he had talked to the boys, including Tommy, about it but he 
did not remember whether he had so warned Tommy that par-
ticular morning. 'rommy testified that he had never noticed 
the shot marks and indentations on the metal around the 
opening in the high house, and that while he was working 
there no shot had ever before come through the opening. 
Mrs. Ruth, coowner of the range with her husband, testified 
that she had not been aware that shooters had hit the high 
house though she admitted that she had seen the puncture 
holes on the metal around the opening and that they were 
"painted over." Defendant testified that he had never been 
inside the high house; that he knew that when shot was 
discharged from a shotgun, it spread out into a pattern but 
he did not know what the area of spread might be; and that 
he assumed that the shot would not go into the high house. 
He further testified that in talking to Mrs. Ruth immediately 
after the accident, she said "we know it is not your fault" 
and the ''boys are often looking out the windows and they 
have been warned about that." 
[1] At defendant's request, the court gave the following 
instruction: ''You are instructed that the duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff in this case was to exercise ordinary 
care, that is the care that would be exercised by a reasonably 
prudent person in the same or similar circumstances. In this 
particular instance, however, the defendant was possessed 
of and using a firearm and a firearm is capable of causing 
severe injury. For that reason the defendant was required 
to foresee the possibility of injury and, to avoid it, to exercise 
a degree of care commensurate with and in proportion to the 
danger involved, and, in the exercise of ordinary care, the 
quantum or amount of care exercised may be greater than 
would be necessary if he was not handling a loaded weapon. 
This is but another way of saying that the amount of care to 
be exercised by a reasonably prudent person will vary with 
the circumstances, and where the danger of injury is greater 
the amount of care to be used may be great." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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This instruction correctly informed the jury that the 
standard of care required of defendant was that of ordinary 
care under the circumstances. (Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 
325 [287 P.2d 7]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 
Cal.2d 310 [282 P.2d 12] .) But plaintiffs attack the use 
of the permissive word "may" as diluting the established 
quantum of caution required of a person handling a loaded 
firearm. They claim that the instruction thereby in-
jected a quantitatively false element into the jury's delibera· 
tions and left the jury without a proper appreciation of the 
controlling rules for judging defendant's conduct; and that 
they did not waive the error because of a ''failure to request 
an instruction" which correctly recited the high degree of 
caution required to meet the test of ordinary care in the use 
of firearms. (Sexton v. Brooks, 39 Cal.2d 153, 158 [245 P.2d 
496] .) [2] With reference to this latter point, it should be 
said that the instructions which plaintiffs did propose upon the 
subject were incorrect and were properly refused because 
they attempted to place the burden of proof upon defendant to 
show that he was not negligent. (Jensen v. Minard, supra, 44 
Cal.2d 325, 328-329.) 
[3] While the challenged instruction is not a model, it 
must be read with the other instructions and in the light of 
the circumstances, in determining whether there was any 
prejudicial error. It was only one of a series of instructions 
given on this phase of the case. Thus, the trial court first 
defined 'negligence" (BAJI 101), and then stated that it was 
"not an absolute term, but a relative one," so that "in decid-
ing whether there was negligence in a given case, the conduct 
in question must be considered in the light of all the surround-
ing circumstances" (BAJI 101-A). Next, the court defined 
"ordinary care" (BAJI 102) and amplified that standard as 
follows: "Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the 
ordinarily prudent person varies in direct proportion to the 
danger known to be involved in his undertaking, it follows 
that in the exercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution 
will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and the 
surrounding circumstances. To put the matter in another way, 
the amount of caution involved in the exercise of ordinary care 
increases or decreases as does the danger that reasonably 
should be apprehended." Then followed the challenged in-
struction concerning the application to the use of firearms. 
In the challenged instruction it was stated as a matter of 
law that "a firearm is capable of causing severe injury" and 
situation also has 
defendant did 
to the 
on this range. 
house showing how it had been 
with shot indicate that defendant's shooting in that direction 
from station number 8 was precisely what was 
him. The skeet testified, without 
that because the of a shot from station number 
increased as the bird approached the 
it was and in accordance with 
rules for the shooter to point his gun at the high house and 
fire upon the bird 's emergence therefrom. 
[ 4] There was no error in receiving evidence of the 
and customs of skeet shooting. They have a direct 
uc.:cuu"' on the question of negligence even though not 
of themselves establish the standard of prudent conduct. 
(Fowler v. System Transit Lines, 37 Cal.2d 68 
P.2d 339] ; Hargrave v. Acme Tool & Testet· Co., 125 Cal. 
App.2d 34, 39 [269 P.2d 913] .) Defendant did not 
and so far as the evidence had no 
that there was any likelihood of 
in the direction of the high house. 
anyone 
[5] 
the 
It is an elementary principle that negligence is 
to anticipate danger. '' [R] easonable 
essential to the of negligence, and 
the criterion for determining whether it exists in a 
case, and reasonable of harm is the fundamental 
basis of the law of . On the other 
oeeur, or 
465 
in their contention that the 
to instruct the jury on the doc-
on Jensen v. JJ!inard, 
supra1 44 Cal.2d 325. There defendant fired a rifle at a 
and the bullet struck a child 
No res instruc-
but other instructions were 
foreclosed the from evJaMuei 
of the accident itself as evidence of pos-
Unlike that case where ordinarily such in· 
on a public road ''do not occur 
use due 
at least 
from his own uto~u~"l'" 
failure of the owners of the 
for 
from 
a reason-
of 
on whether it can 
that the accident 
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Accordingly, plaintiffs' proposed instructions, which stated 
unqualifiedly that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was ap-
plicable, were properly refused. (Burr v. Sherwin Williams 
Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 692 [268 P.2d 1041].) 
[8] Likewise the court did not err in refusing to give 
plaintiffs' instruction on contributory negligence. It read: 
"You are instructed that plaintiff Tommy Tucker was not con-
tributorily negligent and you must find against the defendant 
upon that issue.'' Plaintiffs insist that under any view of the 
evidence Tommy could not have been negligent; but accord-
ing to his own testimony, he moved forward to reload the trap 
machine as soon as the bird had been released. 
The subject of contributory negligence was properly covered 
in the instructions. The court defined contributory negligence 
(BAJI 103), set forth the various issues to be determined 
in relation to whether there was contributory negligence 
chargeable against Tommy ( BAJI 113), and declared that a 
child is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult 
(BAJI 147). It appears that there was evidence from which 
the jury could have found that Tommy was guilty of con-
tributory negligence: He had worked some three months on 
the skeet range and several times in the high house; he reason-
ably should have seen the peppered indentation marks on the 
high house and the metal plates around the opening from 
which the bird emerged; he had been warned of the danger 
that shot might come through the opening; he knew that he 
was not wearing any protective clothing or a face mask ; and 
he was aware of the difficulty of shooting from station number 
8. The jury could have inferred that Tommy had not stepped 
back on loading the machine but remained in direct line of 
the opening and so was hit, or that he had stepped back and 
thereafter stepped forward prematurely. Accordingly, whether 
Tommy was contributorily negligent was a question for sub-
mission to the jury rather than an issue for determination 
as a matter of law through the giving of plaintiffs' requested 
instruction. 
[9] Nor did the court err in giving, at defendant's re-
quest, instructions on the question of assumption of risk. 
These were BAJI 207 to 207-E. They included the distinction 
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
(BAJI 207-0), the declaration that the person's "age, ex-
perience and capacity along with all the other surrounding 
circumstances as shown by the evidence" should be con-
sidered (BAJI 207 -D), and the statement that the "plaintiff 
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did not assume the risk of any injury that could have come 
to him only through the negligence of the defendant" (BAJI 
207 -E). Here there was evidence from the circumstances of 
Tommy's work in the high house and his knowledge of skeet 
range practice which would support a finding that he had 
voluntarily assumed the risk of his employment. [10] Con-
trary to plaintiffs' position, the doctrine of assumption of risk 
is not limited to an action by an employee against his em-
ployer because of injuries suffered in the course of employ-
ment. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 161-
162 [265 P.2d 904]; see also Warnke v. Griffith Co., 133 Cal. 
App. 481, 494 [24 P.2d 583] .) 
[lla] Finally, there was no error in giving, at defendant's 
request, the following instruction: "You are instructed that it 
is the duty of an employer to furnish to his employees a 
safe place for them to work. You are further instructed that 
defendant, Philip Lombardo, if exercising ordinary care him-
self, was entitled to assume that plaintiff's employer had fur-
nished to plaintiff a safe place within which to work and he 
could further assume that the plaintiff would reasonably use 
the protection afforded to him by the employer." Plaintiffs 
argue that this instruction was improper in that it relates 
only to a duty owed by an employer to an employee as to 
safety regulations (Lab. Code, §§ 6401-6402; Douglas v. Ma-
loney, 105 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [233 P.2d 59]; Neuber v. 
Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596, 619 [195 P.2d 501]), 
and can have no pertinence to the issues between the parties 
here. [12] But every person who is exercising ordinary 
care "has a right to presume that every other person will 
perform his duty and obey the law." (Hosking v. Danforth, 
1 Cal.App.2d 178, 181 [36 P.2d 427]; see also Giovannoni v. 
Union Ice Co., 108 Cal.App. 190, 195 [291 P. 461] .) [llb] Ac-
cordingly here, defendant was entitled to rely upon the as-
sumption that the owners of the skeet range had obeyed the 
law and had exercised reasonable care toward him and toward 
persons working on the range through having the range in 
reasonably safe condition. Apparently the jury accepted de-
fendant's testimony that he did not know, and had no reason 
to assume, that any shot fired from the designated stations 
would enter the high house. The jury therefore probably con-
cluded that defendant had done exactly what he was supposed 
to do in firing from station number 8 and had violated no 
duty of care in so doing. The issues involved were fairly 
the reasons therein 
in the case at bar and a new trial. 
